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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONTROL OF OBSCENITY
THROUGH ENFORCEMENT OF A NUISANCE STAT-
UTE-Chateau X, Inc. v. State ex rel. Andrews, 302 N.C. 321, 275
S.E.2d 443 (1981).
INTRODUCTION
In the case regarded by authorities as the first obscenity case
in Anglo-American jurisprudence,' Sir Charles Sedley, after be-
coming drunk, performed a strip tease on the balcony of a London
tavern. He also delivered a profane speech and poured bottles of
urine on the crowd below. The court fined and imprisoned Sir
Charles for breach of the peace.
In the Sedley case, the court imposed penal sanctions after the
drunken man committed the offending acts." As in the case of Sir
Charles, states today provide for the enforcement of obscenity laws
through criminal prosecution.3 Criminal obscenity statutes, how-
ever, are not the only means available to states in their efforts to
control the dissemination of obscene materials. States, in their
discretion, may choose to regulate obscenity by criminal prosecu-
tion, a qui tam action,0 by an injunction, or by some or all of these
remedies combined. The due process clause does not restrict the
states in their selection of the best way to regulate obscenity.7 The
fourteenth amendment, however, imposes one restriction on the
development of regulatory schemes. States may not regulate ob-
1. F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 4 (1976).
2. King v. Sedley, 1 KEBLE 620 (K.B.), 83 ENG. REP. 1146 (1663).
3. F. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 197, 228. Hogue, Regulating Obscenity
Through the Power to Define and Abate Nuisances, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1
(1978). North Carolina provides for criminal prosecution of obscenity related of-
fenses under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.2 et seq. (1973).
4. F. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 228. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 88 (4th ed. 1971); H. WOOD, THE LAW OF NUISANCE § 68 (3d ed. 1893).
5. A qui tam action is an action brought by an individual pursuant to a stat-
ute which provides for a penalty for the violation of the statute. A portion of the
penalty goes to the individual for bringing the action and the remainder of the
penalty goes to the state. Such an action provides for a division of recovery on the
theory that the state's portion is compensation to the state for permitting the
individual to prosecute in his own name. See Salonen v. Farley, 82 F. Supp. 25
(D.C. Ky. 1949); Williams v. Wells Fargo & Co., 177 F. 352 (8th Cir. 1910).
6. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957).
7. Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 50 (1961).
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scenity using a procedure which unreasonably curtails constitu-
tionally protected expression.8 In order to ensure that constitution-
ally protected speech is not curtailed by overbroad obscenity
regulations, laws which proscribe obscene materials must contain
the most rigorous procedural safeguards.' Nuisance statutes which
have authorized injunctions against allegedly obscene speech
before a judicial determination of obscenity have been struck down
by courts. Such injunctions risk the possible restriction of constitu-
tionally protected speech and, thus, operate as impermissible prior
restraints of protected expression.10
North Carolina, like other states, has chosen to regulate the
dissemination of obscenity through a nuisance abatement statute,"'
Chapter 19 of the General Statutes, as well as through criminal
prosecution."' The Supreme Court of North Carolina answered the
question of whether the state's nuisance abatement statute violates
the fourteenth amendment's proscription against the unreasonable
curtailment of protected expression in State ex rel. Andrews v.
Chateau X, Inc.,' 8 hereinafter Chateau X-I." The Court com-
pared the practical effect of an injunction issued under Chapter 19
with the effect of a criminal statute and found that Chapter 19 was
nothing more than a personalized criminal statute. Because the
Chapter 19 injunction imposed the same restrictions which could
be constitutionally imposed by a criminal proceeding, the injunc-
tion did not operate as an unconstitutional prior restraint on pro-
tected expression."
8. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963).
9. Id.
10. F. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 240-241.
11. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-1 et seq. (1977). The argument has been made for
an exclusive obscenity nuisance statute, rather than a system of dual remedies
under both criminal and civil statutes. See Rendleman, Civilizing Pornogra-
phy-The Case for an Exclusive Obscenity Nuisance Statute, 44 U. CX. L. REv.
509 (1977). Professor Rendleman includes in the text of his article a proposed
nuisance statute which he suggests should be the sole means of regulating obscen-
ity. See also Edelstein & Mott, Collateral Problems in Obscenity Regulation: A
Uniform Approach to Prior Restraints, Community Standards, and Judgment
Preclusion, 7 SEroN HALL L. REv. 543 (1976).
12. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1 et seq. (1973).
13. 296 N.C. 251, 250 S.E.2d 603 (1979).
14. Because the North Carolina Supreme Court rendered a second Chateau
X opinion after remand from the United States Supreme Court, the first Chateau
X opinion will hereinafter be cited as Chateau X-I.
15. 296 N.C. at 265, 250 S.E.2d at 611.
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The United States Supreme Court, in Vance v. Universal
Amusement Co.,' 6 struck down a Texas nuisance statute similar to
North Carolina's nuisance statute because an injunction issued
pursuant to the Texas statute operated as an unconstitutional
prior restraint. Under the Texas statute, an exhibitor or distribu-
tor of allegedly obscene materials could be penalized for violating
the terms of an injunction restraining the material in question
even if a court later determined the material not to be obscene.17
The Court found the nuisance statute to be more onerous than a
criminal statute because nonobscenity will always be a defense in a
criminal proceeding. Because the Texas nuisance statute was more
onerous than a criminal statute, it operated as an unconstitutional
prior restraint of protected speech.18
After granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
vacated the Chateau X-I decision and remanded to the Supreme
Court of North Carolina for further consideration in light of the
decision in Vance.1' On remand, the Supreme Court of North Car-
olina reconsidered the constitutional validity of a Chapter 19 in-
junction in Chateau X, Inc. v. State ex rel. Andrews,20 hereinafter
Chateau X-II.21 The Chateau X-II court distinguished Vance by
pointing out that nonobscenity will always be a defense in a con-
tempt proceeding brought for an alleged violation of a Chapter 19
injunction. 2 The North Carolina nuisance statute does not share
the constitutional infirmity of the Texas abatement procedure be-
cause a defendant can never be found in contempt of a Chapter 19
injunction for showing or selling nonobscene material. Chapter 19,
therefore, is not more onerous than a criminal statute. The North
Carolina court, in the second Chateau X opinion, held that the
North Carolina nuisance statute did not constitute an impermissi-
ble prior restraint.3 8
Prior to the Vance decision, the United States Supreme Court
had not articulated any specific standards for determining the con-
stitutionality of the regulation of obscenity through nuisance
16. 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (per curiam).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Chateau X, Inc. v. Andrews, 445 U.S. 947 (1980).
20. 302 N.C. 321, 275 S.E.2d 443 (1981).
21. In order to distinguish between the two Chateau X opinions, the opinion
which is second in time will be referred to as Chateau X-II.
22. 302 N.C. at 329-30, 275 S.E.2d at 448-49.
23. Id. at 329, 275 S.E.2d at 448.
1981l
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abatement laws."" The sparse Vance opinion and the Court's lim-
ited holding make it uncertain whether the Court intended the
"more onerous than a criminal statute" language to be the control-
ling standard for nuisance abatement statutes. Even if the Court's
language is intended to be a constitutional test, the full scope of
the factors to be considered when applying the test cannot be as-
certained from the scant Vance opinion. The North Carolina Su-
preme Court's holdings in the Chateau X opinions seem to be cor-
rect in light of the limited holding in Vance. A substantial number
of other states, however, have held that nuisance abatement stat-
utes similar to North Carolina's do operate as unconstitutional
prior restraints. 6
THE CASE
A. Chateau X-I
The Defendants, a South Carolina corporation, and its officers
and employees, operated a theatre and bookstore in Jacksonville,
North Carolina. The State filed a complaint pursuant to Chapter
19 of the General Statutes against Defendants, seeking to have the
theatre, the bookstore, and the materials exhibited and sold at the
establishments declared nuisances. The State also sought a perma-
nent injunction restraining defendants from maintaining the prem-
ises in Jacksonville or any other place in North Carolina as a nui-
sance. Defendants filed an answer and a motion to dismiss based
on the ground that Chapter 19 was unconstitutional. The court de-
nied Defendants' motion to dismiss."'
24. The Supreme Court, however, has said that the United States Constitu-
tion does not preclude the abatement of obscenity through a civil nuisance stat-
ute, provided that first amendment standards are met. See Paris Adult Theatre I
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
25. Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., Inc., 350 So.2d 158, 165-68
(La. 1977); Mitchum v. State ex rel. Schaub, 250 So.2d 883 (Fla. 1971); New
Rivieria Arts Theatre v. State, 219 Tenn. 652, 412 S.W.2d 890 (1967). In 1978,
proprietors of adult bookstores sought a judgment declaring that Chapter 19's
provisions for the abatement of obscenity as a nuisance were constitutionally in-
valid. Judge Dupree held the provisions of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-5 which author-
ized an injuncton against the distribution of allegedly obscene materials not pre-
viously adjudicated obscene to be an unconstitutional prior restraint. Fehlaber v.
State, 445 F. Supp. 130 (E.D.N.C. 1978). See also Const. Law, N.C. L. Rzv. 946-47
(1978).
26. 296 N.C. at 253, 250 S.E.2d at 605.
[Vol. 4:139142
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After personally viewing two of the State's twenty exhibits, 7
the trial court found the exhibits viewed and the remainder of the
exhibits introduced into evidence to be obscene."" The trial court
found the theatre, the bookstore, and the films and magazines
which the state introduced into evidence to be nuisances as defined
by Chapter 19."" A permanent injunction was issued enjoining De-
27. Id. State's Exhibit Number 15 was a film called "Airline Cockpit." State's
Exhibit Number 3 was a magazine entitled "Spread Your Legs." The parties stip-
ulated that all films and magazines listed in the inventory marked as State's Ex-
hibit Number 20 contained substantially similar material as evidenced by the two
exhibits viewed by the court.
28. Id. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-1.1(2) (1977) provides that: "Lewd matter" is
synonymous with "obscene matter" and means any matter:
(a) Which the average person, applying contemporary community stan-
dards, would find, when considered as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; and
(b) Which depicts patently offensive representations of:
1. Ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated:
2. Masturbation, excretory functions, or lewd exhibition of the gen-
itals or genital area;
3. Masochism or sadism; or
4. Sexual acts with a child or animal.
Nothing herein contained is intended to include or proscribe any
writing or written material, nor to include or proscribe any matter which,
when considered as a whole, and in the context in which it is used, pos-
sesses serious literary, artistic, political, educational, or scientific value.
29. 296 N.C. at 254, 250 S.E.2d at 605. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-1.2 (1977).
Types of nuisances.-The following are declared to be nuisances wherein
obscene or lewd matter or other conduct prohibited in N.C. GEN. STAT. §
19-1(a) (1977) is involved:
(1) Any and every place in the State where lewd films are publicly
exhibited as a predominant and regular course of business, or pos-
sessed for the purpose of such exhibition;
(2) Any and every place in the State where a lewd film is publicly
and repeatedly exhibited, or possessed for the purpose of such
exhibition;
(3) Any and every lewd film which is publicly exhibited, or pos-
sessed for such purpose at a place which is a nuisance under this
Article;
(4) Any and every place of business in the State in which lewd pub-
lications constitute a principal or substantial part of the stock in
trade;
(5) Any and every lewd publication possessed at a place which is a
nuisance under this Article;
(6) Every place which, as a regular course of business, is used for
the purposes of lewdness, assignation, gambling, the illegal posses-
sion or sale of narcotic drugs as defined in the North Carolina Con-
1981]
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fendants from selling or exhibiting any of the items included in the
State's twenty exhibits and from selling or exhibiting any other ob-
scene matter in the future which depicted sexual conduct specified
in the trial court's order.8 0
Pursuant to N.C. General Statutes § 7A-31(b),3 1 both parties
trolled Substances Act, or prostitution, and every such place in or
upon which acts of lewdness, assignation, gambling, the illegal pos-
session or sale of intoxicating liquor, the illegal possession or sale of
narcotic drugs in the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act, or
prostitution, are held or occur.
30. 296 N.C. at 255, 250 S.E.2d at 606. The portion of the trial court's order
which Defendants argued constituted an impermissible prior restraint stated:
2. The defendants. . . are hereby enjoined and restrained from:
d. Possessing for exhibition to the public illegal, lewd matter consist-
ing of films which appeals to the prurient interest in sex without serious
literary, artistic, educational, political or scientific value and that depicts
or shows:
(1) Persons engaging in sodomy, per os, or per anum,
(2) Enlarged exhibits of the genitals of male and female persons
during acts of sexual intercourse, or
(3) Persons engaging in masturbation.
e. Possessing for sale and in selling illegal lewd matter which consti-
tutes a principal or substantial part of the stock in trade at a place of
business consisting of magazines, books, and papers which appeal to the
prurient interest in sex without serious literary, artistic, educational, po-
litical, or scientific value and that depicts or shows:
(1) Persons engaged in sodomy, per os, or per anum,
(2) Enlarged exhibits of the genitals of male or female persons dur-
ings acts of sexual intercourse, or
(3) Persons engaging in masturbation.
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 (1981) provides, in part, that upon motion by
either party or by the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the court may, in its
discretion, certify the cause for review by the Supreme Court, either before or
after it has been determined by the Court of Appeals. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(b)
specifically provides:
(b) In causes subject to certification under subsection (a) of this sec-
tion, certification may be made by the Supreme Court before determina-
tion of the cause by the Court of Appeals, when in the opinion of the
Supreme Court:
(1) The subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest,
or
(2) The cause involves legal principles of major significance to the
jurisprudence of the State, or
(3) Delay in final adjudication is likely to result from failure to cer-
tify and thereby cause substantial harm, or
(4) The work load of the courts of the appellate division is such
144 [Vol. 4:139
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petitioned the Supreme Court of North Carolina prior to a deter-
mination by the Court of Appeals. The Court allowed the petition
on May 8, 1978. s'
In determining the constitutional validity of the permanent
injunction issued against Defendants, the North Carolina Supreme
Court used the same form of analysis used by the United States
Supreme Court in Kingsley Books v. Brown,s" where the Court re-
viewed the constitutionality of a statute which authorized a pre-
liminary injunction enjoining the distribution of allegedly obscene
materials." As in Kingsley, the North Carolina Court found the
permanent injunction issued under Chapter 19 not to be an uncon-
stitutional prior restraint on first amendment rights. The Chapter
19 injunction is constitutionally valid because the sanction im-
posed by the injunction could also be constitutionally imposed
through enforcement of a criminal obscenity statute."
Defendants then petitioned the United States Supreme Court
for further review. On April 25, 1980, the Court granted certiorari,
vacated the decision of Chateau X-I, and remanded the case to the
Supreme Court of North Carolina" for further consideration in
light of Vance v. Universal Amusement Co.s7
B. Vance v. Universal Amusement Co.
The United States Supreme Court, in Vance, scrutinized a
Texas civil statute similar to North Carolina's Chapter 19." Plain-
that the expeditious administration of justice requires certification.
32. 296 N.C. at 254, 250 S.E.2d at 605.
33. 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
34. Id. at 439. Unlike the permanent injunction issued in Chateau X-I, the
injunction issued in Kingsley was a temporary injunction restraining the distribu-
tion of specifically named material pending a trial on the merits.
35. 296 N.C. at 265, 250 S.E.2d at 611.
36. Chateau X, Inc. v. State ex rel. Andrews, 445 U.S. 947 (1980).
37. 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (per curiam).
38. Id. at 310, n. 2. The pertinent portion of the Texas statute is as follows:
(a) The habitual use, actual, threatened or contemplated, of any
premises, place or building or part thereof, for any of the following uses
shall constitute a public nuisance and shall be enjoined at the suit of
either the State or any citizen thereof:
(1) For gambling, gambling promotion, or communicating gambling
information prohibited by law;
(2) For the promotion or aggravated promotion of prostitution, or
compelling prostitution;
(3) For the commercial manufacturing, commercial distribution, or
19811
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tiff operated an indoor, adults-only motion picture theatre. Defen-
dant, the County Attorney, informed Plaintiffs landlord that the
county intended to seek an injunction to abate the public nuisance,
and as a result, the landlord advised Plaintiff that its lease would
be terminated. Plaintiff filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas, seeking an injunction
against Defendant and declaratory relief. Plaintiff claimed that the
Texas civil nuisance statute authorized an unconstitutional prior
restraint on Plaintiff's first amendment rights."
Citing Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson4 0 as supporting author-
ity, the District Court held that the Texas procedure operated as
an unconstitutional prior restraint. The statute authorized an in-
junction against future showings of films not judicially determined
to be obscene based on a determination that obscene films had
been shown in the past. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's determination that the statute violated first amendment
rights, holding that the statute would allow the issuance of an in-
junction against future exhibition of unnamed films that depict
particular acts enumerated in the state's obscenity statute.4' De-
fendants appealed and the Supreme Court noted probable
jurisdiction.42
The Supreme Court limited its review to the issue of whether
an injunction issued under the Texas nuisance statute constitutes
a greater prior restraint than a criminal statute. The Court agreed
with the lower court's assessment that an injunction issued under
the Texas statute operates as a prior restraint of indefinite dura-
tion on the exhibition of motion pictures which have not been judi-
cially determined to be obscene. An injunction authorized by the
Texas statute would be more onerous than a criminal statute be-
cause an exhibitor who chose to show films in violation of the in-
junction would be subject to contempt proceedings for violating
the express terms of the injunction even if the films shown were
commercial exhibition of obscene material;
(4) For the commercial exhibition of live dances or exhibition which
depicts real or simulated sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse.
TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN., ART. 4667 (Vernon).
39. 445 U.S. at 309.
40. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
41. A panel majority of the Court of Appeals had found the Texas procedure
"basically sound." The court granted rehearing and reversed the panel's holding.
Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159 (1978).
42. 442 U.S. 928 (1979).
[Vol. 4:139
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finally determined not to be obscene. Because nonobscenity will al-
ways be a defense in a criminal prosecution, the civil injunction
would be more onerous than a criminal obscenity statute."
C. Chateau X-H
On remand, the Supreme Court of North Carolina distin-
guished Vance, upholding its prior ruling that the injunction is-
sued pursuant to Chapter 19 did not operate as an unconstitu-
tional prior restraint. Using the same form of analysis that it had
used in Chateau X-I, the Supreme Court of North Carolina noted
that the infirmity of the Texas statute lay in the possibility that an
exhibitor who violated an anti-obscenity injunction could still be
subjected to contempt proceedings even if a court later finds that
the materials subject to the injunction are not obscene. The North
Carolina statute does not share the same infirmity because, as
pointed out in the Chateau X-I decision, nonobscenity will always
be a defense to any contempt action for violation of a Chapter 19
injunction. The Court incorporated by reference the Chateau X-I
opinion and reaffirmed its prior decision that a Chapter 19 injunc-
tion did not operate as an unconstitutional prior restraint because
such an injunction is no more onerous than a criminal obscenity
statute."
BACKGROUND
The first amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press . . . . ,,4 Freedom of speech and press
means "principally, although not exclusively, immunity from previ-
ous restraints or censorship."' 6 If a court determines that speech,
once uttered or published, is not protected by the first amend-
ment, the proper remedy is to impose sanctions on the party re-
sponsible for the expression. Modern constitutional analysis of first
amendment issues relies on the concept of free speech as expressed
by Blackstone when he wrote: "The liberty of the press is indeed
essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no
previous restraints upon publications. . . .,,, Any governmental
43. 445 U.S. at 316.
44. 302 N.C. at 330, 275 S.E.2d at 449.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
46. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
47. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 151-52 (2d
19811
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action which seeks to restrain speech prior to its publication or dis-
tribution to the public constitutes a prior restraint."
The Supreme Court has said, "Any system of prior restraint of
ed. rev. 1872).
48. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTxONAL LAW 744 (1978)
(hereinafter cited as J. NowAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW). See generally Emerson,
The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw AND CONTEMPT. PROB. 648 (1955). Prior
restraints have also been defined as restrictions on communication which will in-
duce "excessive caution in the speaker" before it has been determined that the
first amendment does not protect the speech. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973). See generally Mur-
phy, The Prior Restraint Doctrine in the Supreme Court: A Reevaluation, 51
NOTm DAME L. Rzv. 898 (1976).
In order to effectuate a more accurate analysis of the prior restraint issue,
Professor Rendleman has classified prior restraints into several categories. One
category includes standards orders, which are injunctions restraining the future
dissemination of obscene materials. A standards order usually incorporates the
standard of obscenity set forth in the applicable state statutes into the permanent
injunction. See generally Rendleman, supra note 11, at 550-57. Using the above
definition, the permanent injunction issued in Chateau X-I would seem to be a
standards order.
Professor Rendleman's proposed nuisance abatement statute "seeks to pre-
vent the authorities from using a 'standards' injunction to threaten contempt," in
order to prevent a "chill on the marketplace of ideas." Rendleman, supra note 11,
at 557.
Some courts have held that incorporation of a statutory definition of obscen-
ity in a court order is a proper means of regulating obscenity. See Locke v. State,
516 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Richards v. State, 497 S.W.2d 770 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1973).
In Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159, 169 (5th Cir. 1978),
probable jurisdiction noted, 442 U.S. 928 (1979), the court countered the proposi-
tion that standards orders are constitutionally permissible, first of all, by saying
that "few of us have the omniscience to determine, in advance of a final judicial
ruling, whether a film is legally obscene." The difficulty in defining obscenity was
also noted by Justice Exum in his Chateau X dissents. 296 N.C. at 277, 250
S.E.2d at 618-19; 302 N.C. at 331, 275 S.E.2d at 450. Secondly, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals said that material depicting specific acts proscribed by a statute
may eventually be found not to be obscene since Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973), requires the material to be viewed as a whole. The Court also noted that
standards orders would be impermissible because state law cannot define the
"contemporary community standards" that must be applied by the fact finder, as
required by Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977). The dissent disagreed,
arguing that an injunction which incorporates a constitutional definition of ob-
scenity contains sufficient specificity to satisfy first amendment standards. 587
F.2d at 174. See Note, A Nuisance-Abatement Statute that, when Applied to
Obscenity, Authorizes a Prior Restraint on the Future Exhibition of Unnamed
Films, Violates the United States Constitution, 13 GA. L. Rzv. 1076, 1085 (1979).
10
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expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity."'" In the area of obscene speech,
prior restraint may take one of two forms. (1) Prior restraint oc-
curs when allegedly obscene material is seized or preliminarily en-
joined prior to a judicial determination of obscenity.50 States have
accomplished this form of restraint through criminal laws or civil
nuisance statutes. (2) Prior restraint also occurs through the re-
quirement that motion pictures or books be approved by a licens-
ing or review board before the material is distributed or exhibited
to the public."1
In Roth v. United States," the United States Supreme Court
addressed the question of whether obscene speech deserved first
amendment protection. Prior to the Roth decision, the Court had
always assumed, without so holding, that the guarantee of free
speech and of the press did not protect obscenity." The Roth
Court, when analyzing the constitutional status of obscene speech,
recognized that the first amendment protects any idea which has
the "slightest" redeeming social value. Implicit in the history of
that amendment is the idea that obscenity lacks any redeeming
social value and thus is undeserving of constitutional protection."
49. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
50. See generally Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property at 104 East Tenth
Street, Kansas City, Mo., 367 U.S. 717, 734-38 (1961); see also Kingsley Books,
Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 437 (1957).
51. See generally Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S.
684 (1959).
52. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
53. Dicta in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) and
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1952) indicated that lewd and ob-
scene expression was beyond the protection of the first amendment guarantee of
free speech. Roth was the first opinion where the Court expressly held that ob-
scenity did not deserve first amendment protection. J. NOWAK, CONSTrUTONAL
LAW, 833 (1978).
54. 354 U.S. at 485. The United States Supreme Court articulated the cur-
rent standard for determining obscenity:
(1) whether the average person, applying contemporary community stan-
dards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interests;
(2) Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(3) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). While the Miller Court recognized
that state regulatory schemes must be derived by state legislatures, the Court sug-
19811
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Because obscenity is totally lacking in redeeming social value,ss the
Court's previous assumption concerning obscene speech became a
rule of law when the Court held that "obscenity is not within the
area of constitutionally protected speech or press.""
Consistent with the Court's later holding in Roth, dictum in
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson5 7 indicated that obscenity might
be an exception to the general rule that the government may not
impose restraints on speech prior to its publication. In Near, a
Minnesota statute authorized injunctions restraining newspapers
which published malicious, scandalous and defamatory speech.
The United States Supreme Court struck down the Minnesota
statute because it authorized restraint of future expression based
on a finding of a past statutory violation. While articulating the
general rule prohibiting prior restraint of expression, the Near
Court also recognized several possible exceptions, including ob-
scenity. The Court said that the requirements of decency could
justify restraint of obscene speech prior to its publication."
Many states have enacted both criminal and civil procedures
for the regulation of obscene speech." Prosecutions for the viola-
gested examples of what a state statute could define under part (2) of the Miller
test: "(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual
acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated. (b) Patently offensive representa-
tions or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibitions,
of the genitals." Id. at 25.
The definitions of obscenity in North Carolina's criminal statute and nui-
sance statute generally follow the language of the Miller standard. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-190.1 (b)(2) (1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-1.1(2)(a) (1977).
The nuisance statute, unlike the criminal statute, distinguishes between writ-
ten matter and other matter. The nuisance statute excludes all written matter
from the definition of obscenity. Other matter is excluded only if it has serious
literary, artistic, political, educational, or scientific value "when considered as a
whole and in the context in which it is used. . . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-1.1
(1977). The language "in the context in which it is used" is additional language
which does not appear in the criminal statute. One commentator has suggested
that if this language creates a "narrower range of exclusions than Miller," and
encompasses matter not covered by Miller," the Chapter 19 definition of obscen-
ity is unconstitutional. Hogue, supra note 3, at 40.
55. See supra note 53.
56. Id.
57. 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
58. Id. at 716.
59. See F. SCHAUER, supra note 3. The following state laws are examples of
statutes which authorize the regulation of obscene expression through enforce-
ment of nuisance abatement statutes: LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13.4711 (West 1968);
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, §§ 28C-28H (West Supp. 1977); N.D. CNr. CODE
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tion of criminal obscenity laws do not present any first amendment
problems because the violator is only being punished for speech
which has already been uttered or published. Consistent with the
first amendment's guarantee against previous restraint, the alleged
violator was not hindered or prevented from publishing the expres-
sion. Unlike a criminal statute which punishes after the fact of
publication, an injunctive prohibition against future publication of
allegedly obscene material can bring about the very governmental
action the first amendment was intended to prevent, the restraint
of protected speech before the communication takes place. The
evil of prior restraint of allegedly obscene speech lies in the possi-
bility that the state may restrain protected speech as well as un-
protected speech. 60
The United States Supreme Court has never decided whether
a permanent injunction restraining obscene materials not yet adju-
dicated to be obscene constitutes an impermissible prior re-
straint.6 ' In Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 2 however, the Su-
§§ 12.1-27.1-01 to 27.1-12 (1976); OHIo Rv. CODE ANN. § 3767.01(c) (Page 1971);
TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4667(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 18.2-384
(1975). For a review of state court decisions which have dealt with the regulation
of obscenity as a nuisance see Hogue, supra note 3, at 22.
60. See generally J. NOWAK, CONsTITUTIONAL LAW 742 (1978); F. SCHAUER,
THE LAW OF OBSCENrrY 228-29 (1976). The line of demarcation between protected
speech and unprotected speech is "finely drawn." Any system of regulation which
seeks to control unprotected speech must use "sensitive tools" to ensure that the
control of unprotected speech does not also include control of expression which
the first amendment protects. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958).
61. 296 N.C. at 263, 250 S.E.2d at 610. Although such an injunction has not
been examined by the United States Supreme Court, the Court has laid down
procedural guidelines for states seeking to regulate obscenity prior to its publica-
tion. In Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965), the Court articulated
the following guidelines: (1) the censor must afford the accused party a prompt
hearing; (2) the censor has the burden of showing that the material is obscene;
and (3) the censor must seek a final judicial determination of the obscenity issue.
While the Supreme Court has yet to deal with the precise question of whether a
permanent injunction restraining future distribution of unnamed obscene materi-
als is unconstitutional, the following is a list of courts which have dealt with the
regulation of obscenity through nuisance abatement statutes: Fehlaber v. State,
445 F. Supp. 130 (E.D.N.C. 1978); General Corp. v. State ex rel. Sweeton, 294 Ala.
657, 666-67, 320 So. 2d 668, 676 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); Cactus
Corp. v. State ex rel. Murphy, 14 Ariz. App. 38, 41-42, 480 P.2d 375, 378-79
(1971); People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater, 16 Cal. 3d 360, 371-73,
546 P.2d 733, 740-41, 128 Cal. Rptr. 229, 236-37, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976);
Evans Theatre Corp. v. Slaton, 227 Ga. 377, 180 S.E.2d 712, cert. denied, 404 U.S.
950 (1971); State v. A Motion Picture Entitled "The Bet," 219 Kan. 64, 547 P.2d
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preme Court upheld the validity of a preliminary injunction
restraining the distribution of allegedly obscene materials for a
short period of time pending trial. In determining the constitu-
tional validity of the injunction, the Court compared the practical
effect of the injunction with the practical effect of a criminal law
prohibiting the distribution of obscene material. The Court first
recognized that both statutes interfered with the distribution pro-
cess precisely at the same time. The imposition of restraint,
whether by use of an injunction or by use of a criminal complaint,
occurs after publication but possibly before the material is sold to
the public. In each instance, the distributor of the allegedly ob-
scene material is put on notice that the sale of the materials in
question during the period pending trial may subject him to penal
consequences. A violation of either a preliminary injunction pend-
ing trial or a criminal statute will result in the same penalty, fine
and imprisonment. The Court reasoned that restraining the distri-
bution of allegedly obscene material through a temporary injunc-
tion or a criminal proceeding resulted in the same deterrent effect,
"the threat of subsequent penalization."6 s
ANALYSIS
A. Chateau X-I
The Defendants argued that the trial court's order automati-
cally constituted a prior restraint because the restraints that the
court imposed were in the form of an injunction. In answer to the
Defendants' argument, the Supreme Court of North Carolina first
noted that in the area of obscenity, prior restraints may take one
of two forms: (1) a seizure of allegedly obscene material or an in-
junction restraining the dissemination of allegedly obscene mate-
rial prior to a judicial determination of obscenity;" and (2) licens-
ing boards which require board approval before an exhibitor or
distributor can solicit the public.65 The Court did not decide in
760 (1976); State ex rel. Ewing v. A Motion Picture Film Entitled "Without a
Stitch," 37 Ohio St. 2d 95, 104, 307 N.E.2d 911, 917-18 (1974), appeal dismissed
sub nom., Art Theater Guild, Inc. v. Ewing, 421 U.S. 923, (1975); New Rivieria
Arts Theatre v. State ex rel. Davis, 219 Tenn. 652, 412 S.E.2d 890 (1967).
62. 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
63. Id. at 442-43.
64. Marcus v. Search Warrant of Property at 104 East Tenth Street, Kansas
City, Mo., 367 U.S. 717, 734-38 (1968).
65. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 437 (1957).
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Chateau X-I whether the Chapter 19 injunction constituted a
prior restraint. Rather, it summarily dismissed the issue by saying
that the United States Supreme Court had never struck down an
injunction such as the one issued in Chateau X-I and further
noted that no United States Supreme Court decision could be
found that even labelled such an injunction a prior restraint."
The Supreme Court of North Carolina reached the merits of
the prior restraint issue by assuming that the permanent injunc-
tion operated as a prior restraint. Recognizing that prior restraints
are not per se unconstitutional," the Court utilized the technique
used by the United States Supreme Court in Kingsley Books, Inc.
v. Brown." The Court recognized that the injunction issued in
Kingsley was a temporary injunction pending trial, rather than, as
in Chateau X-I, a permanent injunction issued after trial. Despite
this procedural difference, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
thought that the Kingsley decision offered guidance when deter-
mining the constitutionality of the permanent injunction. The Su-
preme Court of North Carolina compared the effect of a Chapter
19 injunction in practical operation with the practical effect of a
criminal statute which proscribes the distribution of obscene
material."
The Court first noted that the trial court's order specified in
detail the material prohibited by the injunction. While the trial
court could have made the scope of the injunction broader by re-
straining all materials which fall within the statutory definition of
obscenity, the trial court's order described the prohibited material
with even more specificity than the obscenity statute."° Because of
the specificity of the trial court's order, the Defendants in this case
suffered from less indecision concerning the materials which were
actually prohibited than would be the case had the State chosen to
prosecute under a criminal statute.
The Court also referred to the nature of the possible penalties
which the court could impose if the Defendants violate the perma-
nent injunction. As the United States Supreme Court noted in
Kingsley, the North Carolina Court pointed out that a violation of
either a permanent injunction proscribing the sale of obscenity or a
66. 296 N.C. at 263, 250 S.E.2d at 610.
67. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
68. 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
69. 296 N.C. at 264, 250 S.E.2d at 611.
70. For a comparison between the statutory definition of obscenity and the
wording of the trial court's order, see supra notes 28 and 30.
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criminal statute proscribing the sale of obscenity will result in the
same penalties, fine and imprisonment. Whether a distributor or
exhibitor of obscene speech violates the terms of an injunction or
the terms of a criminal statute, the same penal sanctions flow from
either violation.7
The Court, while noting that a violation of either legal remedy
results in the same penal sanctions, also noted that enforcement of
obscenity through an injunction was actually more favorable to a
defendant than enforcement of a criminal obscenity statute." A
defendant in a criminal proceeding is subject to penalties resulting
from the initial violation of the criminal statute. A defendant in a
Chapter 19 proceeding, however, will not be subject to fines and
imprisonment until he has violated the terms of the injunction.
Unlike the criminal defendant, the defendant in a nuisance abate-
ment proceeding is not subject to criminal penalties for the initial
dissemination of obscene materials. Because a defendant gets a
"second chance" before the court imposes criminal penalties, a
Chapter 19 injunction imposes a lesser burden on defendant's
rights than does a criminal obscenity statute. 8
The Supreme Court of North Carolina continued its compari-
son of a Chapter 19 injunction and a criminal obscenity law by
analyzing the procedural similarities between the two means of ob-
scenity regulation. In a Chapter 19 proceeding, just as in a criminal
obscenity proceeding, the defendant can always defend on the
ground that the allegedly obscene material is not obscene. If the
court determines that the material in question is not legally ob-
scene, the court cannot issue a permanent injunction restraining
the dissemination of such material as a nuisance, nor can the court
71. 296 N.C. at 264, 250 S.E.2d at 611. The obscenity related statutes in
Chapter 14 of the North Carolina General Statutes provide that violation shall be
punishable as a misdemeanor. A person found guilty of a violation shall be fined
or imprisoned in the discretion of the court. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
190.1 et seq. (1973). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-4 provides:
Violation of injunction; punishment.-In case of the violation of any
injunction granted under the provisions of this Chapter, the court, or, in
vacation, a judge thereof, may summarily try and punish the offender. A
party found guilty of contempt under the provisions of this section shall
be punished by a fine of not less than two hundred ($200.00) or more
than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail
not less than three or more than six months, or by both fine and
imprisonment.
72. 296 N.C. at 264, 250 S.E.2d at 611.
73. Id.
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impose sanctions under a criminal statute. In both a Chapter 19
proceeding and a criminal prosecution, the State has the burden of
proof on the obscenity issue. The standard of proof is also the
same in either a Chapter 19 proceeding or a criminal trial.74 In ei-
ther proceeding, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the material in question is obscene.7 '
The final procedural similarity between a Chapter 19 proceed-
ing and a criminal proceeding that the Court addressed was the
right to a jury trial. A person subject to an injunction issued under
Chapter 19 does not have a right to a jury trial in a contempt pro-
ceeding for violation of the injunction. Under the federal constitu-
tional standard, a defendant in a criminal contempt proceeding
similarly has no right to a jury trial if the authorized penalty or the
penalty actually imposed does not exceed imprisonment for six
months. In North Carolina, the penalty authorized in a criminal
contempt proceeding does not exceed imprisonment for six
months. Thus, defendants in both a Chapter 19 contempt proceed-
ing and a criminal contempt proceeding do not have a right to a
trial by jury. The lack of a right to a jury trial does not alter the
conclusion that a Chapter 19 injunction and a criminal obscenity
statute achieve the same effect on the dissemination of obscene
speech.76
After comparing the characteristics of a Chapter 19 injunction
and a criminal obscenity statute, the North Carolina Supreme
Court concluded that a contempt proceeding initiated for a Chap-
ter 19 injunction is no more than a "personalized criminal stat-
ute. 177 The North Carolina Legislature could constitutionally im-
pose the same restrictions on the dissemination of obscenity
through a criminal statute. The effect of Chapter 19 in practical
operation is no different than the effect of a criminal obscenity
statute. Because an injunction restraining the future exhibition or
distribution of obscene materials does not impose greater restric-
tions on free speech interests than does a criminal obscenity stat-
ute, the regulation of obscenity through North Carolina's nuisance
abatement statute does not operate as an unconstitutional prior
restraint.78
74. Id. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5A-15(f) (Cure. Supp. 1977).
75. Id.
76. 296 N.C. at 265, 250 S.E.2d at 611.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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B. Vance v. Universal Amusement Co.
In Vance v. Universal Amusement Co.,71 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals found a Texas nuisance abatement statute to be
unconstitutional because it operated as an impermissible prior re-
straint on free speech interests. The United States Supreme Court
reviewed the limited issue of whether Texas' nuisance abatement
statute operated as a greater prior restraint on speech than does a
criminal obscenity statute."0 The Court agreed with the Court of
Appeals' statement that a regulation of forms of speech such as
motion pictures must comply with more stringent safeguards than
are necessary for the regulation of other types of nuisances. Consis-
tent with the preference for subsequent punishment rather than
prior restraint, the Court also said that the burden of supporting
an injunction prohibiting future expression is greater than the bur-
den of supporting criminal sanctions after the expression has al-
ready occurred.6 '
The Court found that the Texas nuisance abatement statute,
when coupled with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, authorized
injunctions restraining the exhibition of motion pictures for an in-
definite period of time prior to a judicial determination that the
motion pictures are obscene. The Court reasoned that an exhibitor
who was subject to such an injunction could be penalized for vio-
lating the terms of the injunction pending a final adjudication on
the obscenity issue, even if a court later determines that the mo-
tion pictures are not obscene. Under the Texas procedure, nonob-
scenity would not be a defense to a charge that the express terms
of the injunction had been violated. Unlike the Texas nuisance
abatement proceeding, the defense that the material is not obscene
will always be available in a criminal proceeding. Because a con-
tempt proceeding lacked the procedural safeguard of nonobscenity,
an injunction authorized by the nuisance statute would be more
79. 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (per curiam).
80. The second issue which the Court agreed to decide was whether the
"Court of Appeals erroneously held that no prior restraint of possible First
Amendment materials is permissible." Id. at 315. The majority summarily dis-
missed this issue by disagreeing with appellant's interpretation of the scope of the
Court of Appeals' decision. The Court said that the Court of Appeals simply held
that the Texas statutes were procedurally deficient, and that the statutes author-
ized a procedure more onerous than is permitted by Freedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51 (1965), and Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
Id. at 317.
81. 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (per curiam).
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onerous and objectionable than a criminal obscenity statute. The
Texas nuisance abatement procedure was more onerous and objec-
tionable than a criminal obscenity statute, and thus, operated as
an unconstitutional prior restraint.8 2
C. Chateau X-H
As the North Carolina Court noted, the United States Su-
preme Court's sparse opinion in Vance rendered the North Caro-
lina Court's reconsideration of the prior restraint issue difficult.
83
Despite this difficulty, the Chateau X-II Court again noted that
the nonobscenity of the allegedly obscene material will always be a
defense in a contempt proceeding brought for an alleged violation
of a permanent injunction. Unlike the procedure in Vance, a per-
son subject to a Chapter 19 injunction cannot be found in con-
tempt if the materials exhibited or distributed in alleged violation
of the injunction are judicially determined not to be obscene. Be-
cause a Chapter 19 injunction allows the defense of nonobscenity
in a contempt proceeding, the statute is no more onerous or objec-
tionable than a criminal obscenity statute. The decision in Vance,
therefore, is not controlling and an injunction authorized by Chap-
ter 19 does not constitute an impermissible prior restraint on pro-
82. Id. at 316. The Court, at footnote 14 of the majority opinion, noted that
the District Court and the Court of Appeals had also construed the Texas proce-
dure to authorize the issuance of a temporary restraining order on the basis of an
ex parte showing. The lower courts also believed that a temporary injunction of
indefinite duration could be obtained on the basis of a showing of probable suc-
cess on the merits.
The dissent in Vance argued that the Texas courts should have the opportu-
nity to interpret Texas law. The dissent felt that the record did not sufficiently
justify the assumptions concerning the Texas procedure that the lower courts had
made. The dissent also felt that the federal court's interpretations of the Texas
procedure were dubious in light of Locke v. State, 516 S.W.2d 949 (Ct. App.
1974), which made a de novo on-the-merits review of a trial court's determination
of obscenity. The dissent pointed out that the de novo review in Locke would
seem to discredit the federal court's interpretations of the Texas procedure, espe-
cially the interpretation that a temporary restraining order could be issued on a
showing of probable success on the merits. 445 U.S. at 320 (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing). A second dissent, written by Mr. Justice White, with whom Mr. Justice
Rehnquist joined, will be discussed infra at note 84.
83. The North Carolina Court said that the brief treatment of the prior re-
straint issue rendered the task of determining the precise holding "quite diffi-
cult." The North Carolina Court proceeded on what it believed was the most logi-
cal basis for the Vance decision. 302 N.C. 327, 275 S.E.2d at 447, n.7.
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tected speech.6 "
Justice Exum wrote a dissenting opinion in Chateau X-II
which incorporated all of the arguments made in his Chateau X-I
dissent and also articulated additional reasons why Vance should
control the North Carolina Court's decision. Justice Exum felt that
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson" controlled the prior restraint is-
sue, requiring a finding that a permanent injunction issued under
Chapter 19 operates as an unconstitutional prior restraint. The
dissent in Chateau X-I cited decisions of three other states' high-
est courts which have found nuisance statutes "virtually identical"
to Chapter 19 to be unconstitutional prior restraints." He also re-
84. Id. at 329, 275 S.E.2d at 449. While the holding in Vance was phrased to
include both named and unnamed films, the North Carolina Court interpreted the
procedures in Vance to be unconstitutional only as to named films. The North
Carolina Court presumed that, in Texas contempt proceedings for violation of an
injunction, the state must prove that the films shown allegedly in violation of the
injunction are obscene. If, however, the injunction restrained the sale or exhibi-
tion of named films which subsequently are determined by a court not to be ob-
scene, a contemnor could be penalized for violating the express terms of the in-
junction, regardless of the judicial finding that the named films are not obscene.
The North Carolina Court seems to have based its named-unnamed distinction on
the Vance majority's answer to the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White. Mr.
Justice White argued that the Texas procedure was not unconstitutional because
an injunction granted under the Texas statute will be phrased in terms of the
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), definition of obscenity. 445 U.S. at 321
(White, J., dissenting). The Vance majority disagreed, saying that a temporary
injunction prohibiting the exhibition of specific, named films could be entered on
a showing of probable success on the merits. 445 U.S. 312, n. 4.
85. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
86. Parish of Jefferson v. Bayou Landing Ltd., 350 So. 2d 158 (La. 1977);
Mitchem v. Schaub, 250 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 1971); New Rivieria Arts Theatre v.
State, 219 Tenn. 652, 412 S.W.2d 890 (1967). Like the defendants in Chateau X,
bookstore owners in Mitchem were enjoined from further operation of the store as
a nuisance and were also restrained from disseminating in the future any obscene
materials. Similar injunctions were also issued in Parish of Jefferson and New
Riveria Arts Theatre. The courts in all three cases held that a permanent injunc-
tion restraining the dissemination of unnamed obscene materials was unconstitu-
tionally overbroad. The Tennessee Supreme Court also said that only specific,
named films adjudicated to be obscene may be permanently enjoined. The above
three decisions are directly contrary to the North Carolina Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Chateau X. One commentator has said, "Nuisance proceedings, to be valid,
must be restricted to materials already determined to be obscene, and if those
proceedings include any blanket ban on future sales, publications, or exhibitions,
they are constitutionally impermissible." F. SCHAUR, supra note 1, at 240. In
State v. Hess, 540 P.2d 1165 (Okla. 1975), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that
a permanent injunction restraining the sale of materials not adjudicated to be
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ferred to Felhaber v. State,7 a decision by the federal district
court for the Eastern District of North Carolina which held that as
to materials "not previously adjudged" to be obscene, a Chapter 19
injunction would operate as an unconstitutional prior restraint.88
Despite the fact that the statute in Near restrained the future
dissemination of political speech rather than obscene speech, the
dissent felt that the similarities between the Near injunction and
the Chateau X injunction brought the restraint imposed by the
court in Chateau X within the general rule that the government
cannot restrain speech prior to a judicial determination that the
speech is not protected. In Near, as in Chateau X, the trial court
imposed a restraint on the dissemination of speech not yet pub-
lished and not yet adjudicated to be unprotected speech. While the
Chateau X majority distinguished Near's prohibition against prior
restraint on the ground that the first amendment does not protect
obscenity,s" Justice Exum was not persuaded. He relied on Near
and New York Times Co. v. United States" when arguing that the
illegal nature of the speech does not alter the constitutional prohi-
bition against prior restraint. In light of the fact that the Near
court said that the "primary requirements of decency may be en-
forced against obscene publications,"' Justice Exum's concern
with a Chapter 19 injunction seems to be not that injunctions may
be issued against speech which has been judicially determined to
be obscene, but that protected speech may be restricted by an in-
junction which merely incorporates a statutory definition of ob-
obscene was unconstitutionally overbroad.
87. 445 F. Supp. 130 (E.D.N.C. 1978).
88. Id. The same rationale that courts have used to invalidate permanent in-
junctions restraining future dissemination of unnamed materials has also been
used by courts to strike down statutes which authorize the complete closing of
establishments for a definite period of time because of previous sales or exhibi-
tions of obscene materials. See People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater,
17 Cal. 3d 42, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 550 P.2d 600 (1976); State v. Motion Picture
Entitled "The Bet," 219 Kan. 64, 547 P.2d 760 (1976); Sanders v. State, 231 Ga.
608, 203 S.E.2d 153 (1974); Gulf States Theatres of Louisiana, Inc. v. Richardson,
287 So. 2d 480 (La. 1974); General Corp. v. State ex rel. Sweeton, 294 Ala. 657,
320 So. 2d 668 (1975). The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to
decide whether a nuisance abatement statute which provides for a one year clo-
sure of real property after a finding of obscenity constitutes a prior restraint.
United States Marketing, Inc. v. Idaho, 631 P.2d 622 (Id. 1981), cert. granted, No.
81-741 (Jan. 12, 1982).
89. 296 N.C. at 267, 250 S.E.2d at 612.
90. 403 U.S. 717 (1971).
91. 283 U.S. at 716.
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scenity. Justice Exum felt that allegedly obscene material must be
"judicially seen" before the government can permanently restrict
obscene expression."
The dissent also reasoned that the procedures used by the
United States Supreme Court in Kingsley did not apply to the
type of injunction issued by the trial court in Chateau X-I. Justice
Exum quoted the Kingsley court as saying that the New York stat-
ute authorized a limited injunction issued under specific procedu-
ral safeguards. Justice Exum noted that the majority opinion in
Kingsley pointed out that New York's procedure "studiously with-
holds restraint upon matters not already published and not yet
found to be offensive."" Because the Chapter 19 injunction issued
in Chateau X-I restricts the future dissemination of speech which
a court has not yet found to be obscene, Justice Exum concluded
in his dissent that a permanent injunction issued against the dis-
semination of unnamed speech operates as an unconstitutional
prior restraint.94
In his dissent in Chateau X-II, Justice Exum again reasoned
that the decision in Near prohibits an injunction restraining future
expression based on a finding that unprotected speech has oc-
curred in the past. Justice Exum felt that the Vance decision pro-
vided further support for the rule against prior restraints which
was first articulated in Near. He referred to the portion of the
Vance opinion which said the burden of justifying a ban on future
expression is even heavier than the burden of justifying criminal
penalties for expression which has already been uttered. Justice
Exum said that the distinction between the Texas procedure and
North Carolina's procedure was "finely spun;" the distinction was
without a difference when judging the constitutionality of a perma-
nent injunction against future expression."
Despite the North Carolina Supreme Court's reaffirmance of
Chapter 19's constitutionality, it is not totally clear that the per-
manent injunction issued by the Chateau X trial court is constitu-
tional. The Chateau X decisions may be questionable in light of
the fact that the United States Supreme Court has not yet estab-
lished clearly defined guidelines for states desiring to regulate ob-
scenity through nuisance abatement statutes. The Kingsley ap-
92. 296 N.C. at 277, 250 S.E.2d at 619.
93. Id. at 273, 250 S.E.2d at 616, quoting 354 U.S. at 445.
94. Id. at 296, 250 S.E.2d at 621.
95. 302 N.C. at 330, 275 S.E.2d at 449.
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proach of comparing the practical effect of a criminal obscenity
statute and an injunction restraining obscenity seems to be a per-
missible means of analysis in light of the Court's holding in Vance.
As in Kingsley, the court in Vance compared the effect of an in-
junction with the effect of a criminal statute, indicating that the
standard for determining the constitutional validity of injunctions
restraining the dissemination of obscene speech is determined by
referring to the practical effect of criminal obscenity laws."
The difficulty with the Vance opinion lies in the fact that if
the constitutional test is whether the nuisance abatement statute
is more onerous than a criminal statute, the factors which courts
can consider when applying this test remain undefined. The lim-
ited holding in Vance indicates that one factor which the courts
may consider is whether the nuisance statute, like a criminal ob-
scenity statute, allows for the defense of nonobscenity. As Justice
Exum pointed out in his Chateau X-I dissent, other possible fac-
tors exist which could arguably render a nuisance abatement stat-
ute more onerous than a criminal statute."7 Differing burdens of
proof in civil actions and criminal proceedings is one such factor."
The criminal element of scienter, if lacking in a contempt proceed-
ing for violation of an injunction, could also be a factor which
would render the contempt proceeding more onerous than a com-
parable criminal proceeding."s Justice Exum also pointed out that
the right to jury trial in criminal cases is a factor which would
render a summary contempt proceeding more onerous than a trial
96. The Court ruled that the Texas procedure operated as an unconstitu-
tional prior restraint because the restraint imposed by an injunction was more
onerous and more objectionable than a criminal obscenity statute. 445 U.S. at
316.
97. 302 N.C. at 331, 275 S.E.2d at 449.
98. In Cooper v. Mitchel Brothers' Santa Ana Theatre, - U.S. -, 102 S.
Ct. 172 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that in a public nuisance
action brought against a motion picture theatre, the first and fourteenth amend-
ments do not require proof of obscenity beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court
said that requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in an obscenity case is solely
a matter of state law. The Court's decision in Cooper would seem to indicate that
the burden of proof in an obscenity case is not a factor to be considered when
determining if a nuisance abatement statute is more onerous than a criminal ob-
scenity statute. As the Supreme Court of North Carolina noted in Chateau X-I,
North Carolina requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in obscenity cases. 296
N.C. at 264, 250 S.E.2d at 611. See N.C. GEN. STAT. 5A-15(f) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
This provision of the statute provides that in a plenary proceeding for contempt,
the "facts must be established beyond a reasonable doubt."
99. 302 N.C. at 331, 275 S.E.2d at 449.
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authorized by a criminal obscenity statute.00
The criminal element of scienter is the defendant's guilty
knowledge and intent.' 0 ' If scienter is a factor which courts should
consider when comparing the effects of a nuisance abatement stat-
ute and a criminal obscenity statute, the lack of the element of
scienter may render North Carolina's nuisance abatement statute
more onerous than a criminal statute.' 0 2 North Carolina's criminal
obscenity statute has been judicially construed to require proof of
"guilty knowledge" and intent before a defendant can be found
guilty of violating the statute.'0 ' While several sections of Chapter
19 refer to knowledge,104 the provisions do not expressly require
that a defendant possess guilty knowledge before he is found to be
in violation of a Chapter 19 injunction.' 0 6 If Chapter 19 proceed-
ings do not require the state to prove the element of scienter
before a defendant is penalized for violation of an injunction, the
absence of this element would render a Chapter 19 proceeding
more onerous than a criminal obscenity statute.'"
100. Id.
101. See State v. Bennant, 222 N.C. 277, 22 S.E.2d 552 (1942). As an element
of obscenity related offenses, scienter is knowledge of the contents of the material.
People v. Finkelstein, 11 N.Y.2d 300, 183 N.E.2d 661, 229 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1962).
For an analysis of scienter in a Chapter 19 proceeding, see Hogue, supra note 3,
at 41, n. 201.
102. See State ex rel. Ewing v. "Without A Stitch", 37 Ohio St. 2d 95, 307
N.E.2d 911 (1974), appeal dismissed sub nom., Art Theater Guild, Inc. v. Ewing,
42 U.S. 923 (1975). The court upheld the nuisance abatement statute in this case
because, among other reasons, the statute required proof of scienter.
103. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1 (1973). The North Carolina
Court of Appeals has held that this section requires a finding of intent and guilty
knowledge before a person can be convicted of a violation. State v. Bryant, 16
N.C. App. 456, 192 S.E.2d 693 (1972), cert. denied, 282 N.C. 583, 193 S.E.2d 747,
vacated and remanded, 413 U.S. 913 (1973).
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-1.1(1) (1977) provides, in part, that
"'[K]nowledge' or 'knowledge of such nuisance' means having knowledge of the
contents and character of the patently offensive sexual conduct which appears in
the lewd matter . .. ."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-1.3 (1977) provides, in part, that "[Wihere circumstan-
tial proof warrants a determination that a person had knowledge of the nuisance
prior to such service of process, the court may make such a finding."
105. See 302 N.C. at 331, 275 S.E.2d at 450 (Exum, J., dissenting). See supra
note 71 for the text of the statute autorizing a summary contempt proceeding.
106. The United States Supreme Court has held that a criminal statute
which makes the dissemination of obscene materials a criminal offense without
requiring scienter is unconstitutional. Absent a scienter requirement, the Court
said that a criminal obscenity statute would have a tendency to inhibit constitu-
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The lack of a right to a jury trial in a Chapter 19 contempt
proceeding could also render the practical effect of a Chapter 19
injunction more onerous than a criminal obscenity statute. While
the Chateau X-I Court rejected such a contention, 10 7 the Court's
analysis of this issue is not wholly satisfactory. The Court's deter-
mination that the right to a jury trial does not exist in either a
Chapter 19 contempt proceeding or a criminal contempt proceed-
ing does not present any analytical problems when a Chapter 19
injunction only restrains specific, named films. The determination
of obscenity would be made in the initial abatement proceeding1"0
and at that stage the defendant would have a right to a jury trial if
he so desired. 1'0 Where, however, the trial court restrains the fu-
ture dissemination of obscene materials not specifically named in
the order, a defendant in a Chapter 19 contempt proceeding will
not have the initial determination of obscenity made by a jury.110
Because the material in question was not adjudicated obscene by
the court issuing the injunction, the question of whether the previ-
ously unnamed material is obscene must be determined before the
court can decide whether the permanent injunction has been vio-
lated."' As to material which was not specifically named in the
injunction but which arguably falls within the statutory definition
of obscenity, the issue of obscenity is not determined until the
state initiates the contempt proceeding.'2
The parallel proceeding under a criminal obscenity law is not
a criminal contempt proceeding but, rather, an initial criminal trial
on the merits. A criminal trial on the merits is analogous to a
Chapter 19 contempt proceeding because, in both instances, penal
sanctions will not be imposed until a court finds that the material
tionally protected speech. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153-55 (1959). In
light of the Court's decision in Smith, if Chapter 19 does not require proof of
scienter before the court imposes penalties for violating an injunction, it could be
argued that the injunction inhibits protected speech.
107. 296 N.C. at 265, 250 S.E.2d at 611.
108. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-1.2 (1977) (types of nuisances) and N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 19-5 (1977) (content of final judgment and order).
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19.2-1 (1977) provides that the Attorney General, dis-
trict attorney, or any private citizen may maintain a civil action to abate a nui-
sance under this Chapter. A defendant in such a nuisance abatement action has
the right to a trial by jury. See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 25; N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13.
110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-4 (1919) authorizes the judge to summarily try and
punish the offender for violation of the injunction.
111. 296 N.C. at 264, 250 S.E.2d at 611.
112. Id.
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in question is obscene.11 3 While the defendant in the initial Chap-
ter 19 proceeding had a right to trial by jury, a Chapter 19 con-
tempt proceeding will determine the status of material which was
previously unnamed without the right to a jury trial. In both a
criminal trial on the merits and a Chapter 19 contempt proceeding
where previously unnamed material has been disseminated, the
constitutional status of allegedly obscene material is being deter-
mined for the first time. Yet, the defendant in the criminal trial
has the right to a jury trial, while the defendant in the Chapter 19
contempt proceeding does not. Thus, as to materials not specifi-
cally named in the initial injunction, a Chapter 19 contempt pro-
ceeding could be deemed to be more onerous than a criminal ob-
scenity statute.'1 4
North Carolina is one of the few states which allows a jury
trial in equitable proceedings as well as in actions at law.118 North
Carolina's strong public policy in favor of jury trials is exemplified
by the state constitution which provides that in all civil actions
"there shall be a right to have issues of fact tried before a jury. ' ' 06
In a Chapter 19 contempt proceeding where the court finds, as a
matter of fact, that previously unnamed materials are obscene,
such a finding arguably contravenes North Carolina's strong public
policy in favor of jury trials, if not the state constitution itself.
A Chapter 19 proceeding may also be more onerous than a
criminal statute because the nuisance abatement statute provides
for a different definition of obscenity. In a Chapter 19 abatement
113. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1 (1973). For a discussion of the
procedural characteristics of a Chapter 19 contempt proceeding, see 296 N.C. at
264, 265, 250 S.E.2d at 611.
114. Justice Exum, in his Chateau X-I dissent, regarded the lack of a jury
trial in a Chapter 19 contempt proceeding as one factor which may render such a
proceeding more onerous than a criminal obscenity statute. 302 N.C. at 331, 275
S.E.2d at 449.
115. See generally M. J. Van Hecke, Trial by Jury in Equity Cases, 31
N.C.L. REv. 157 (1953). See N.C. CONsT. art I, § 25; N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13.
In Georgia, the right to a jury trial in equity cases, as far as it exists, is a
statutory right and not a right granted by the state constitution. Lamar v. Allen,
108 Ga. 158, 33 S.E. 958 (1899). See generally GA. CODE ANNOT. § 37-1101 et seq.
In Tennessee, the right to a jury trial in equitable proceedings is granted in the
chancellor's discretion. Miller v. Washington County, 143 Tenn. 488, 226 S.W. 199
(1920). Texas, like North Carolina, grants the right to a jury trial in equity cases
through express provision in the state constitution. See TEx. CONST art. 1, § 15;
TEx. CONST. art. 5, § 10.
116. N.C. CONST. art. 4, § 13.
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proceeding, the fact finder will define obscenity using a contempo-
rary community standard.1 17 The standard which will be applied in
a criminal proceeding is a statewide community standard.19 Ar-
guably, a standard which includes the varying tastes and attitudes
of the entire state populus would be more lenient than a standard
which includes the tastes and attitudes of only one community.
Thus, while material may not be obscene under a statewide stan-
dard, the same material may be obscene under a community stan-
dard.119 If the Chapter 19 community standard is stricter than the
criminal statewide standard, the Chapter 19 proceeding could be
more onerous than the criminal obscenity statute."10
CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has said that the states are
free to choose the means by which they will regulate obscenity. " '
While the most popular means of enforcement is through criminal
obscenity laws,"2 some states, including North Carolina, have also
chosen to regulate obscenity through a nuisance abatement stat-
ute." 3 Subsequent criminal punishment after unprotected speech
has been uttered does not unconstitutionally infringe upon first
amendment rights." 4 A civil injunction, however, which purports
117. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 19-1.1(2)(a) (1977).
118. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.1(b)(2) (1973).
119. Hogue, supra note 3, at 41.
120. The argument can be made, however, that a statewide community stan-
dard is not the more lenient standard. When one considers that there are far more
small, rural communities in North Carolina than there are large, cosmopolitan
areas, the statewide standard could be interpreted to be the standard of the more
numerous, smaller communities. The standards of rural North Carolina would ar-
guably be stricter than the standards of North Carolina's metropolitan areas.
Jury instructions which specifically illustrate for the jury the proper factors
in determining the standard to be applied could render the problem of differing
statutory definitions moot. N.C.P.I.-Crim. § 226.90, however, merely reiterates
verbatim the language of the criminal obscenity statute. The author could not
find any pattern jury instructions for the Chapter 19 definition of obscenity.
For an excellent discussion of the tactical considerations in choosing a jury
trial in obscenity cases, see F. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 253. Professor Schauer
also includes in his treatise suggested jury instructions on all obscenity related
issues. For suggested instructions concernig contemporary community standards,
see F. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 306-07.
121. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
122. F. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 228. See also supra note 4.
123. See generally Hogue, supra note 3.
124. J. NOWAK, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 741. (quoting Blackstone).
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to perpetually restrain speech which falls within the statutory defi-
nition of obscenity, raises the issue of whether such an injunction
operates as an unconstitutional prior restraint.' 2 '
In Chateau X, Inc. v. State ex rel. Andrews,"' the North Car-
olina Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Chapter 19
injunction which perpetually enjoined the dissemination of obscene
speech despite Vance v. Universal Amusement Co."27 where the
Supreme Court of the United States declared unconstitutional a
nuisance abatement statute similar to North Carolina's statute.
The procedure in Vance was unconstitutional because an exhibitor
of allegedly obscene films subject to a temporary injunction could
be punished for violating the express terms of the injunction, even
if a court later found that the films in question were not obscene.
Because the injunction procedure in Vance did not allow for the
defense of nonobscenity, as would a criminal obscenity law, the
nuisance abatement statute was "more onerous and objectionable"
than a criminal obscenity statute, and, thus, operated as an uncon-
stitutional prior restraint." 8
Upon remand in light of Vance v. Universal Amusement Co.,
the North Carolina Supreme Court, in its second Chateau X deci-
sion, distinguished Vance by relying on the first Chateau X deci-
sion. In Chateau X-I, the North Carolina Court reasoned that a
person subject to a Chapter 19 injunction could never be punished
for disseminating protected speech because nonobscenity would al-
ways be a defense in a contempt proceeding brought for alleged
violation of a Chapter 19 injunction."' After analyzing other pro-
cedural characteristics of a Chapter 19 injunction, the Court con-
cluded that Chapter 19 was nothing more than a personalized
criminal statute"30 since the civil injunction had the same practical
effect as a criminal obscenity statute. The Chateau X-II decision
reiterated this view, distinguishing Vance on the basis that nonob-
scenity will always be a defense in a Chapter 19 contempt
proceeding.' 3 1
If the test for determining the constitutionality of prior re-
straints is to compare a nuisance abatement statute's effect with
125. F. SCHAUER, supra note 1, at 228.
126. 302 N.C. 321, 275 S.E.2d 443 (1981).
127. 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (per curiam).
128. Id.
129. 296 N.C. at 264, 250 S.E.2d at 611.
130. Id. at 265, 250 S.E.2d at 611.
131. 302 N.C. at 329, 275 S.E.2d at 448.
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the effect of a criminal obscenity statute, the United States Su-
preme Court's decision in Vance has left the scope of the test un-
clear. If the defense of nonobscenity is the only factor which courts
may consider when determining the constitutionality of civil in-
junctions restraining obscene speech, then North Carolina's Chap-
ter 19 is a constitutional means of regulating obscenity. If, how-
ever, the lack of scienter or the lack of a right to a jury trial are
also factors to be considered, a Chapter 19 contempt proceeding
may be more onerous and objectionable than a criminal obscenity
statute. Chapter 19's definition of obscenity may also prove to be
more onerous than its criminal counterpart if the contemporary
community standards of Chapter 19 are a stricter standard than
the statewide criminal standard. In light of these additional fac-
tors, the constitutional status of North Carolina's nuisance abate-
ment statute, when applied to allegedly obscene speech, could still
be uncertain.
Robert H. Miller, II
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